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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the LLM in Transnational and European Commercial 
Law at the International Hellenic University.  
 
This dissertation is primarily concerned with the question is the competition legislation in 
relation to merger control effective in preventing mergers that result in a dominant market 
position or whether the Commission is exceeding its competence in its application of it causing 
it to become ineffective in the light of relevant case law. 
Looking at the current legislation, the role of the Commission, the judicial review procedure 
available, statistics and the relevant literature, it will conclude that the legislation is sufficient 
as the Commission has successfully prohibited mergers in a dominant position, and that it rarely 
exceeds in competence in this area, and that in those instances the judicial review procedure 
available is sufficient to remedy this.  Although changes may be warranted in this area they are 
yet to come to fruition.  Therefore, merger control in the context of the European Union and 
the commissions role within this area can be said to be appropriate. 
 
I would like to acknowledge my supervisor Dr Pavlos Masouros for his advice, guidance and 
support.  To my family and friends who have given me encouragement and the belief to 
complete this dissertation. Without you all I couldn’t have done it. Thank you. 
  
 
 
Alexandra Sheridan  
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Introduction 
Mergers of companies/concentrations can occur in a domestic supranational or international 
sphere.  There has been an increase worldwide of systems of competition law, over 110 
countries around the globe have competition law, and in over 100 of these countries merger 
control is included in their systems.  This expansion of systems of merger control has had a 
greater impact than other anti-competition rules.  It has been explained as an expansion of 
global business rather than a disregard for the rules, due to the pre notification of mergers being 
mandatory and firms being internation rather than purely domestic, any proposed merger with 
a cross border or international element my find themselves having to notify various competition 
authorities1.  Granted mergers can occur internationally and domestically this discussion will 
specifically focus on mergers that have a cross border element in the European Union2. This 
dissertation will look to assess whether the relevant EU legislation regarding competition law 
on mergers is effective in preventing mergers that result in a dominant market position.  Or if 
the Commission is exceeding its competence in its application of legislation causing it to be 
ineffective in light of relevant case law. 
It will start by looking at the current merger legislation in the EU and describing the role of the 
commission in implementing this legislation.  It will consider the judicial review in the balance 
and checks of the commissions decisions and specifically consider instances in which the 
Courts have overturned the commissions prohibitions of certain mergers.  The case law is thin 
on the ground as we will see, during the years of 1990 and 2015 a total of 24 proposed mergers 
notified to the commission have been prohibited.  Furthermore, only four of these decisions 
have been overturned, Airtours plc3, Schneider Electric4, Tetra Laval5 and MIC6.  These cases 
will be briefly outlined and a review of the relevant literature surrounding this area with be 
discussed highlighting the observations made by academics.  The following observations are 
made following the review, there is no derogatory comments regarding the merger control 
legislation and it is sufficient as does allow for the prohibition of mergers that would create a 
domination as statistics show there have been 28 prohibitions. It is the Commission that has 
                                                          
1 Whish R & Bailey D (2012). Competition Law. New York : Oxford University Press 
2 To be referred to as EU  
3 Case T – 342/99, Airtours v Commission , 2002 E.C.R. II-2585 
4 Case C-440/07 Commission of the European Communities v Schneider Electric SA [2009] E.C.R. I-6413 
5 Case C-12/03 P, Commission V. Tetra Laval, 2005 O.J. (C82) 1 
6 Case T- 310/00 MCI Inc. v. Commission [2004] ECR II- 3253, [2004] 5 CMLR 1274 
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come under scrutiny for the application of the European Union Merger Regulation7’8, its 
assessments and evidence provided when making a judgement.  The Judicial review provided 
by the Community courts has largely been praised as it has moved from allowing the 
Commission a wide discretion in this area to providing a comprehensive review procedure 
narrowing the Commissions discretion.  The introduction of the expedited procedure has 
allowed for a more economic time frame although after its initial inclusion seems to have 
tapered off, this has produced alternatives to be proposed to continue the effective review of 
the Commissions decisions in merger control cases.  It will conclude the system of merger 
control in the EU is sufficient and that the case law in which the Courts have annulled the 
commissions decisions does not support the need for immediate change, regardless that an 
institution taking on the role of judge and jury is not ideal.  There may be alternatives to make 
EU merger control more effective and fair, but currently this is not an option and that 
Commission is far exceeding its competence in its application of legislation causing it to be 
ineffective in light of relevant case law. 
 
Current Merger legislation in the EU 
Competition law constitutes one of the most important aspects of the European Union and has 
a significant influence on European business and industry9.  Title VII, chapter 1, of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union10 lays down the Core legislation for the EU rules on 
competition11  Merger control is just one aspect of competition law.  There are various sources 
of merger control legislation in the EU.  Provisions are located in the Treaty on the functioning 
of the European Union12.   The framework legislation for merger decisions in the EU are the 
EC Merger Regulation13’14 and the Implementing Regulation15.  There are also various notices 
and guidelines published by the commission16.  The first Merger Regulation was adopted by 
                                                          
7 To be referred to as EUMR 
8 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
(the EC Merger Regulation) 
9 Dr Pavlos Masouros – Class notes 
10 TFEU 
11 Dr P Masouros – Class notes 
12 Article 101, 102, and 106 are core provisions 
13 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) 
14 Refer to as ECMR 
15 Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 
16 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice, Commission Notice on a simplified procedure, Commission 
Notice on case referral, Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market, Guidelines on the assessment 
of horizontal mergers, Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers, Commission Notice on remedies, 
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the Council of the European Communities over 25 years ago17 and was referred to as ‘‘EU 
Merger Regulation’’.  It has been amended twice in 1971 and in 2004 resulting in the current 
Merger Regulation in force today18.  In 2004 the Commission published a White paper 
evaluating the Merger regulation since 2004 and also proposes adjustments that if adopted 
would bring significant changes to the current EU framework19.  Mergers/concentrations 
having a community dimension are investigated exclusively by the commission, those that do 
not fall under the merger laws of the Member States20’21.  Community dimension is defined in 
Article 1(2) or Article 1(3) of the EUMR22. 
The main principle of the EUMR is the idea of a one- stop merger control23, this allows that 
concentrations that have a Community dimension shall only be investigated by the 
Commission, this is found Article 21 of the EUMR. Extra weight is given to this via 
Regulation 1/2003 that grants the Commission power to be able to enforce Article 101 and 
102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU.  In addition to the EUMR there is also the 
Implementing regulation24, this sets out the rules on notifications, time limits, right to be 
heard, access to file and remedies to name but a few.  This regulation has been amended and 
provides the format form needed for when undertakings offer commitments to remedy 
concerns that they may have regarding the proposed merger and its effect on competition. 
The commission also publishes notices and guidelines on both procedural and substantive 
issues  including; on the definition of the relevant market, Guidelines on the assessment of 
horizontal mergers, Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations, 
Notice on restrictions directly related and necessary to concentrations,  Notice on Case Referral 
in respect of concentrations, Notice on access to the file, Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice, 
Guidelines on the assessment of non- horizontal mergers.  The Commission has also published 
                                                          
Commission Notice on restrictions, Decision 2011/695/EU of the President of the European Commission on the 
function and terms of reference of the hearing officer in certain competition proceedings and Commission Notice 
on the rules for access to the Commission file 
17 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (OJ L 395, 30 December 1989, p. 1). 
18 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (OJ L 24, 29 January 2004, p. 1). 
19 Koppenfels U (2015) A Fresh Look at the EU Merger Regulation? The European Commission’s White Paper 
‘‘Towards More Effective EU Merger Control’’. Liverpool Law Review (2015) 36:7-31 
20 To be referred to as MS 
21 This is not something that will be discussed as this paper is solely from a EU perspective 
22 This removes a large amount of substantial transactions due to the two-thirds rule where two undertakings are 
from the same member state. 
23 Harker M (2007). Cross-border mergers in the EU : The Commission v The Member States. European 
Competition Journal. Vol 3 No 2. P507 
24 Regulation 802/2004 
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supplementary information including best practice guidelines in regards to merger control, 
these include DG Competition Best Practices on the conduct of EC merger control proceedings, 
Best Practice Guidelines: the Commission’s model texts for divestiture commitments and the 
trustee mandate, Market Share Ranges in Non- confidential Versions of Merger Decisions and 
Best practices for the submission of economic evidence and data collection concerning 
the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and in merger cases. 
 
Role of the Commission and the procedure undertaken 
The Commissions function is set out in Article 213(2) in the Treaty of the Functioning of the 
European Union. It statess 
“The Members of the Commission shall, in the general interest of the Community, be 
completely independent in the performance of their duties. In the performance of these 
duties, they shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government or from any 
other body. They shall refrain from any action incompatible with their duties. Each 
Member State undertakes to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the 
Members of the Commission in the performance of their tasks”.   
It is the Commission that is in charge of initiating legislative process within the EU25’, and 
irrespective of being subject to review by the Community Courts, the Commission “is the 
investigator, judge and jury in competition trials”26.  Klaus has labelled the Commission as the 
“driving force behind Community policy. Todorov and Valcke go as far to brand it the 
“Guardian of the Treaties” 27.  Since the adoption of the initial Merger Regulation28, it is the 
Commission who has the sole authority of implementing the regulation29.  There are various 
internal constituencies that make up the Commission and it is important to mention them 
briefly.  These internal constituencies include the case team and its hierarchy in charge of the 
investigation, the Deputy Director General30, Director of the Policy Directorate, Director 
                                                          
25 Including various other roles including initiating proceedings against MS if they don’t comply with their 
obligations, adminastative functions, regulatory functions, overseeing theMS’s implementation of Councils 
regulations 
26 Whish p844 
27 Todorov F & Valcke A (2006). Judicial review of merger control decisions in the European Union. The antitrust 
bulletin:Vol. 51, No 2/summer 2006 p341 
28 Commission Regulation 4064/1989, 1989 O.J. (L 395). 
29 Kovacic W et al. Merger control procedures and institutions : A comparison of EU and US practice. The antitrust 
bulletin vol 59, No 1/spring 2014 p58 
30 DDG, who is in charge of merger control 
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General of DG COMP, the Competition Commissioner and his cabinet, the Legal Service, the 
Hearing Officer, the Chief Economist and their team, other Commission services and the 
College of Commissioners.  It is an accumulation of all these constituents that work towards 
making decisions whenever a potential case is notified to Commission31.  
Upon the Commission receiving notification of a merger between concentrations that fall 
within the scope of the EUMR32.  The notification of a proposed merger, requires the 
Commission to start their substantive assessment beginning with a definition of the relevant 
product and geographic markets.  The Commissions Notice on market definition states that the 
main purpose is to “identify in a systematic way the competitive constraints that the 
undertakings involved faced”.  In France v Commission33  it was held that a proper definition 
of the relevant market is a necessary precondition for any assessment of the effect of a 
concentration on competition under the EUMR.  Although it is not binding in subsequent 
investigations34.  A merger will be declared incompatible with the common market if it would 
significantly impede effective competition especially in the creation or strengthening of a 
dominant position.  The Commission has a period of 25 days to decide if the proposed merger 
does not raise doubts with its compatibility with EU law35, or that its compatibility does raise 
doubts and that further proceedings must be initiated36.  A Decision in the first instance under 
Article 6.1(b)37 is commonly known as a Phase I decision, these decisions may be straight 
forward, or may involve some commitments from the parties so that the merger is fully 
compatible with EU law38.  The second decision under Article 6.1(c)39 sets into motion a Phase 
II investigation and decision.  Under a Phase II investigation the Commission has to take one 
of three decisions within 90 days of initiating proceedings under Article 6.1(c).  The first that 
                                                          
31 Kovacic W et al (2014) p59 
32 Article 1 EUMR 
33 Cases C- 68/94 France v Commission [1998] ECR I- 1375, [1998] 4 CMLR 829 
34 Case T- 102/96 Gencor v Commission [1999] ECR II- 753, [1999] 4 CMLR 971 
35 Article 6.1(b) EUMR 
36 Article 6.1 (c) EUMR 
37 Article 6.1(b) states “Where it finds that the concentration notified, although falling within the scope of this 
Reglulation, does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market.  A decision declaring 
a concentration compatible shall be deemed to cover restrictions directly related and necessary to the 
implementation of the concentration. 
38 Examples of cases, case COMP/M.6258-Teva/Cephalon, case COMP/M.6447-IAG/bmi, case COMP/M.6459-
Sony/Mubadala/EMI music publishing, case COMP/M.6611-Aria Foods/Milk Link 
39 Article 6.1(b) states “Without prejudice to paragraph 2, where the Commission finds that the concentration 
notified falls within the scope of this Regulation and raises serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common 
market, it shall decide to initiate proceedings. Without prejudice to Article 9, such proceedings shall be closed by 
means of a decision as provided for in Article 8(1) to (4), unless the undertakings concerned have demonstrated 
to the satisfaction of the Commission that they have abandoned the concentration. 
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the merger is compatible with EU legislation40.  The second is that with suggested 
modifications the merger is compatible with EU Law41, and thirdly is that the merger is not 
compatible with EU Law42.  No mergers are to be consummated without the Commission’s 
decision, Article 7 of the EUMR states that “concentration with a Community dimension as 
defined in Article 1, or which is to be examined by the Commission pursuant to Article 4(5), 
shall not be implemented either before its notification or until it has been declared compatible 
with the common market pursuant to a decision under Articles 6(1)(b), 8(1) or 8(2), or on the 
basis of a presumption according to Article 10(6)”  Authorised mergers when parties offer up 
commitments to remedy the concerns in regards to competition by the Commission are legally 
binding. When approving a merger with commitments or prohibiting a merger totally, it 
requires “the full college of Commissioners” in order to make these decisions43’44.  The 
Commission has its own internal checks regarding the fairness of their proceeding, this is in 
the form of a Hearing officer.  There are two Hearing Officers that have a range of functions 
which includes overseeing the fairness in procedure.  Appeals can also be made judicially in 
regards to the commissions decisions.   Any appeal is first taken to the General Court and any 
further appeal is heard by the European Court of Justice45.  
The notification of a proposed merger, requires the Commission to start their substantive 
assessment beginning with a definition of the relevant product and geographic markets46.  The 
Commissions Notice on market definition states that the main purpose is to “identify in a 
systematic way the competitive constraints that the undertakings involved faced”.  In France v 
Commission47 it was held that a proper definition of the relevant market is a necessary 
precondition for any assessment of the effect of a concentration on competition under the 
EUMR.  Although it is not binging in subsequent investigations48.  A merger will be declared 
incompatible with the common market if it would significantly impede effective competition 
especially in the creation or strengthening of a dominant position49.  Prior to the substantive 
                                                          
40 Article 8.1 EUMR 
41 Article 8.2 EUMR 
42 Article 8.3 EUMR 
43 Bellis JF, Porter E, Bael V (Eds) (2011). Merger Control : Jurisdictional Comparisons. London : Sweet and 
Maxwell 
44 Whish p830 
45 Whish p891-7 
46 Bellis JF, Porter E, Bael V (Eds) (2011) 
47 Renshaw A & Blockx J (2013) Judicial review of mergers in the EU. The Antitrust Bulletin : Vol 58, Nos 2 & 
3 Summer-Fall 2013 
48 Coca Cola v Commission 
49 Article 8.3 EUMR 
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test creation in 2004 there was jurisprudence for the definition of dominance50, which was 
applied effectively in single firm and collective dominance and even in vertical mergers, 
however applying it in instances of non-collusive oligopoly caused problems.  It is in this 
instance where we find the case law in which it could be said that the Commission has not 
applied the regulation as it should. 
 
Statistics
 
                                                          
50 Continental Can v Commission, United Brands v Commission. 
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The European Commission publishes statistics regarding mergers, including the number of 
notifications received, referrals, first phase decisions, phase II proceeding initiated, second 
phase decisions, and other decisions51.  
Using the most up to date statistics published, it can be seen that during the years of 1990 to 
December 2015 that commission has received 6063 notifications52. Of these 533253 were 
found compatible with Article 6.1(b)54 and 54 fell outside the scope of the Merger regulation 
all together. Authorised mergers only after the parties offer up commitments in both Phase I 
and Phase II to remedy the Commissions concerns and make the merger compatible with 
merger legislation totalled 368.  This equates to 6.07% of all cases. From the total 
notifications only 24 cases have been prohibited under Article 8.3, this equates to less than 
1%55 of all proposed mergers notified to the Commission. Including the prohibited decisions 
only 238 of all merger notifications have had Phase II proceedings initiated, only 3.93% 
which is a very small number.  
Under Phase II decisions the Commission found that 57 of these proposed mergers were 
compatible under Art 8.1 of the EUMR.  A further 114 were found to be compatible under 
Article 8.2 with commitments from the parties.  As stated above 24 mergers with found to be 
incompatible with the EUMR and therefore prohibited.  The most probation decisions 
occurred in 2001 in which five proposed mergers were denied by the Commission.  Of the 
notifications that had Phase II proceedings initiated 171 have been found compatible under 
Art 8.1 and Art 8.256.  Thus refining the statistics solely to second phase decisions only 12% 
of Phase II cases were prohibited57.   These figures highlight that the Commission do not 
prohibit a large number of notifications that they receive.  However, the statistics confirm that 
the legislation is sufficient in preventing mergers that do result in a dominant position as the 
Commission had prohibited 24 cases without the Community Courts annulling these 
decisions. 
 
 
                                                          
51 Statistics obtained from http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/statistics 
52 The most notifications being received in 2007 with 402 proposed mergers being notified. 
53 88% 
54 EUMR  
55 0.40% 
56 These include commitments from the parties 
57 This does not account for the cases that were withdrawn during Phase II. 
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Judicial review – check and balances for the Commission 
 
Decisions of the Commission are subject to judicial review by the EU Courts, this is set out in 
Art 263 of the TFEU, it states  
“The Court of Justice of the European Union shall review the legality of legislative acts, 
of acts of the Council, of the Commission and of the European Central Bank, other than 
recommendations and opinions, and of acts of the European Parliament and of the 
European Council intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. It shall also 
review the legality of acts of bodies, offices or agencies of the Union intended to 
produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. 
It shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State, the 
European Parliament, the Council or the Commission on grounds of lack of 
competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the 
Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, or misuse of powers” 
Art 18 of the EUMR deals with parties who have the right to appeal the Commission’s 
decisions. This is parties to the transactions and also third parties.  In the case of third parties 
Article 18(4) states 
 “ ….Natural or legal persons showing a sufficient interest and especially members of 
the administrative or management bodies of the undertakings concerned or the 
recognised representatives of their employees shall be entitled, upon application, to be 
heard”. 
Appeals were relatively few in early days of merger control58, In the later half on the 90’s there 
was a growing concern that the Commission possessed too much power as they were 
prosecutor, judge and jury in merger cases, and that the judicial control of the Commission was 
unsatisfactory.  In this period prohibition decisions by the commission increased, however in 
response there was a “dramatic series of annulments” by the courts. In the period between June 
and October 2002 there were three annulments in the cases of Airtours59, Schnider Electric60 
                                                          
58 Collective dominance meaning tended to dominate cases such as See Cases C- 68/94 France v Commission 
[1998] ECR I- 1375, [1998] 4 CMLR 829, paras 169–178; Case T- 102/96 Gencor v Commission [1999] ECR II- 
753, [1999] 4 CMLR 971, paras 148–158.) 
59 2002 E.C.R. II-2585 
60 2002 E.C.R. 11-4071 
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and Tetra Laval61. As Bailey rightfully points out the Community Courts are willing to annul 
merger decisions made by the Commission based on either insufficient evidence or inadequate 
reason, therefore not satisfying the legal standard required. This observation is evidentially 
supported by the above mentioned cases. 
There are two judicial authorities within the European Union, the primary authority is the 
European Court of Justice62 and following an amendment to the EC treaty in 1989 the General 
Court63 which was formally known as the Court of First Instance. After consultation with the 
Commission and Parliament a proposal from the court of justice was agreed by the Member 
States in the Single European Act it created a court that has the jurisdiction to hear and 
determine cases at first instance.  It is subject to appeal to the Court of Justice on points of law 
only.  The court of Justice has the power to declare institution’s decisions void, although it does 
not have effect until the time for appealing has passed64, or if there is an appeal until the ruling 
is passed65.  The General Court was created to assist the ECJ with the constant growth of 
judicial activity, the GC is not independent of the ECJ but forms part of it66.  The GC is the 
first port of call for direct actions against Community legal acts and competition law bought 
by natural or legal persons67.  It does not hear cases brought by any of the EU institutions or 
Member states68.  The legal basis which identifies the ECJ as one of the Unions institutions is 
Article 13 of the TFEU.  Articles 25-281 of the TFEU provide the provision of ECJ, with 
Articles 254-256 concerning the General Court.  Its jurisdiction is set out in Article 256 of the 
TFEU69 
There have been concerns about judicial review especially in the time taken to obtain a 
judgement often making the process to lack any real purpose.  The General Court had been 
viewed as a lengthy process, and perhaps as some academics said granted the commission a 
high level of discretion in is application of economic analysis when making their decisions70. 
The “expedited procedure” has tried to address this.  This entered into force 1st February 2001 
                                                          
61 2002. E.C.R. II-4382 
62 To be referred to as the ECJ 
63 To be referred to as the GC 
64 This removes the confusion that may arise if the CFI and ECJ disagrees 
65 Slynn G (1989) Court of First Instance of the European Communities. Northwestern Journal of International 
Law and Business. Volume 9. Winter 1989. 
66 Whish R & Bailey D (2012) 
67 http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/insrv/resources/edc/Court%20of%20Justice.pdf 
68 Although it does hear Actions brought by member states against the Council relating to acts adopted in the  field 
of State aid, dumping and acts by which it exercises implementing powers 
69 This contains what actions the court has jurisdiction to hear 
70 Todorov F & Valcke A (2006). Judicial review of merger control decisions in the European Union. The antitrust 
bulletin:Vol. 51, No 2 p339.  
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this allows the GC to deal with certain cases in a more efficient time frame, this is important in 
cases of prohibition as market conditions can and may change dramatically from the time of 
the Commission’s decision and the courts judgement. This procedure can only be used in 
simplified pleadings, and by the end of June 2011 ten merger appeals had used the expedited 
procedure.  The shortest case from appeal to judgement was seven months71, and the longest 
was 2172.   Any appeal from the GC is directed to the ECJ.  The ECJ settle disputes regarding 
member states, institutions, and private parties who may have a dispute with either of previous.  
The ECJ’s issues preliminary rulings as a guide for national courts in applying Community law 
when the dispute may mean having to interpret Community law.  The ECJ can also issue legally 
binding opinions following a requests from either a MS or an EU institution regarding 
agreements between the EU and non EU states. 
 
Relevant case law 
It is rare for the Commission to prohibit a merger in its entirety73.  There have been more cases 
in which the Commission has allowed mergers upon commitments by the parties, these are 
referred to as remedies.  The legal basis is found in Art 6(2) of the EUMR in phase I and Art 
8(2) for phase II 
In total the courts have annulled just four of the mergers prohibited by the Commission, this 
occurred in the following cases Airtours plc74, Schneider Electric75, Tetra Laval76 and MIC77.  
It is these four cases that are of particular relevance to this thesis, the facts of the cases and 
reasons for annulment will be set out briefly below. 
Airtours v Commission78 
On the 29th April 1999 the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration by 
Airtours who wished to acquire the whole of First Choice plc by way of a public bid.  The 
notification constitutes a concentration within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger 
                                                          
71 Case T- 87/05 EDP v Commission [2005] ECR II- 3745, [2005] 5 CMLR 1436 
72 Case T- 464/04 Impala v Commission [2006] ECR II- 2289, [2006] 5 CMLR 1049. This case was made slower 
by lmpala themselves. 
73 The statistics have been discussed above 
74 Case T – 342/99, Airtours v Commission , 2002 E.C.R. II-2585 
75 Case C-440/07 Commission of the European Communities v Schneider Electric SA [2009] E.C.R. I-6413 
76 Case C-12/03 P, Commission V. Tetra Laval, 2005 O.J. (C82) 1 
77 [2004] ECR II- 3253 
78 2002 E.C.R. II-2585 
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regulation. This acquisition would result in a reduction of number of major tour operators in 
the UK, however no single firm would be individually dominant.   
The Commission in its 1999 decision79 declared the takeover of First Choice plc by Airtours 
plc to be incompatible with the common market and the operation of the European Economic 
Area pursuant to Article 8(3) of Regulation 4064/89.280, on the basis that it would create a 
collective dominant position. The reasoning used by the Commission suggested that each of 
the remaining firms would be unilaterally able to exercise market power even with acting in a 
coordinated manner. 
The GC however annulled the Commission’s decision.  The court criticized the Commissions 
analysis saying that decision was “vitiated by a series of errors of assessment”81.  The 
judgement associated collective dominance with co-ordinated effects.  If the Commission 
thought the problem in this case was one of unilateral as opposed to co-ordinated effects, there 
was a gap in the MR.  It appeared that the problem was with the word dominance that was not 
necessarily applicable in certain situations.  This raised a great amount of uncertainty82.  The 
judgement however created a clear guidance in future assessments of mergers in an 
oligopolistic market by setting out three necessary conditions, thus intending to make future 
cases more predictable83. 
Schneider Electric84 
In February 2001 Schneider Electric SA and Legrand SA notified the Commission of the 
proposal by Schneider to make a public exchange offer in respect of all the shares in Legrand 
held by the public85. 
The Commission made a declaration of incompatibility under Regulation 1310/97 in relation 
to the merger between S and L as it would result in a concentration that would be incompatible 
with the Common Market86.  The Commission initiated a Phase II investigation, during which 
the Commission des Operations de Bourse announced the final outcome of Schneider’s offer 
                                                          
79 22nd September 1999 
80 Now 2004 EUMR 
81 Overd A (2002) p375 
82 Overd A (2002) P376 
83 Para 62 of Airtourd decision 
84 Case T-310/01, Schneider Electric SA V. Commission, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4071 (annulment of prohibition 
decision) 
Case T-77/02, Schneider Electric v. Commission, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4201 (annulment of divestiture decision) 
85 This was in accordance with the requirement of the then Regulation 4064/89 
86 Para 19 of the judgement 
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for Legarnds shares of which they acquired 98.7%87.  Schneider proposed commitments to 
remedy this which the Commission rejected88 and The Commission required S to divest itself 
of substantial parts of L's business.   The commission decision was annulled by the GC citing 
grounds of inadequate investigation on the commission part and the breach of Schneider’s 
defence by not detailing sufficiently its objections the merger. In this instance the GC also 
awarded damages for participating in the commissions proposed merger control procedure.  
The Commissions appealed to the ECJ not for the reasons that the GC was wrong to overturn 
the prohibition, but that the prohibition was a direct cause of S’s loss resulting from the transfer 
price reduction.  This appeal was only allowed in part and overturned the damages awarded as 
there was no direct causal link between the price reduction and the illegality vitiating the 
Commission's decisions. The direct cause of the damage claimed was S's decision. 
 
Tetra Laval BV89 
In March 200190 Tetra Laval announced a public bid for all outstanding shares in Sidel SA, and 
on the same day acquired 9.75% of the shares in Sidel from Azeo and Sidel’s directors91.  Tetra 
in accordance with the bid acquired the majority of the shares making its holding above 95% 
and its voting rights above 95%.  This acquirement was notified to the commission92 and it was 
agreed that this constituted an acquisition93. 
This merger was prohibited by the Commission on the grounds that the merger would 
encourage T to “leverage” its pre-existing dominant position by persuading its customers to 
choose S’s machines.  This was overturned by the GC94.  Following this the Commission then 
appealed to the ECJ against the decision of the General Court in 2003 to annul their decision 
2004/124. 
On appeal the Commission contended that the GC had exceeded its power of review under the 
EC Treaty Art 230, and Council Regulation 4064/89 Art 2 in that had created a presumption of 
                                                          
87 Para 27 of judgement 
88 Para 59 of judgement 
89 Case C-12/03 commission of the European Communities v Tetra Laval BV [2005] E.C.R. I-987 
90 27th March 2001 
91 Para 6 of judgement 
92 This was in accordance to Article 7(3) of the EUMR 
93 Within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) 
94 Case T – 5/02 Tetra Laval BV v Commission, 2002. E.C.R. II-4382 – Annulment of prohibition  
Case T80 – 02, Tetra Laval v. Commission, 2002 E.C.R. II-45I9 – Annulment of divestiture decision 
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legality unsupported by the evidence in regard to the effect of the merger on the market in 
which T already held a dominant position.  However, the ECJ dismissed the Commissions 
appeal on the grounds that 1) The GC had correctly interpreted the tests applicable in a judicial 
review of a commission decision on the effects of a concentration95, 2) that proof of anti-
competitive effects required precision examination and analysis similar to what is required in 
collective dominance situations96.  Therefore, the GC had neither infringed Art 230 EC or 
misapplied Art 2 of Regulation 4064/89 when reviewing the Commission’s decision. 
 
MCI Inc. v. Commission97 
In October 199998 WorldCom and Sprit signed an agreement and plan of merger99 which was 
to be effected through an exchange of shares between the undertakings100.  This merger was 
between two American companies who notified the Commission of the reasons that they 
believed that there was not community dimension.  They further notified that spirit had 
provided WorldCom a formal undertaking that it would divest itself of its holdings in Global 
One before the merger took place, and so its turnover would not include its portion in Global 
One101.  In June however the parties faxed a letter to the Commission stating that “the parties 
no longer proposed to implement the proposed merger in the form presented in the 
notification”102.  Although the parties had during proceedings notified the Commission of their 
intentions not to merger the commission adopted decision 2003/790/EC prohibiting the merger 
under Art 8(3)103.  The GC annulled the Commission’s decision due to the fact that the parties 
had ended their agreement by the time the Commission had published its decision.  The court 
held the fact that the parties where continuing to negotiate did not allow the Commission to 
adopt a decision104. 
 
                                                          
95 Using the reasoning in Case C-68/94 France v Commissions of the European Communities [1998] E.C.R. I-
1375 
96 Including close examination of the circumstances and conditions in the market 
97 Case T – 310/00 MCI Inc. v. Commission, 2004 O.J. (C 300) 38 
98 4th October 1999 
99 Falling within the definition of a merger under Article 3(1)(a) of the MR  
100 Para 2 of judgement  
101 Para 3 of judgement 
102 Para 13 of judgement 
103 Regulation No 4064/89 
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Literature Review 
The academic literature surrounding merger control is vast, and much has been written about 
the Commissions role in this area, and more recently in the aftermath of the four cases discussed 
above about the Communities Court’s new found willingness to review the commissions 
decisions in this area and further still annulling them when it deems it necessary. The widely 
noted opinion by a prominent amount of commentators is that the Commission plays the most 
“prominent role in the enforcement of merger control”105. The Commission as mentioned 
numerous times receives a ‘great freedom of action’ as it able to choose the types of evidence 
or the economic approach most appropriate to a particular case”106’107.  The Commissions 
appreciation in enforcement was outlined in the case of Consten and Grundig108.  This margin 
of appreciation is due to the fact that it has deal with complex economic matters.   This stance 
has changed since the early 90’s and although the Commission is still given a ‘margin of 
appreciation’ when it comes to the economic assessment of concentrations wishing to merge, 
the commission claim that this discretion has been eroded recently109.  This is something that 
most commentators have picked up on in the light of the Community Courts judgements. 
Traditionally as in the Case of Remia110the court appeared to limit its scope of review to 
“whether the relevant procedural rules have been complied with, whether the statement of the 
reasons for the decision is adequate, whether the facts have been accurately stated and whether 
there has been any manifest error of appraisal or a misuse of powers”111. Indeed, under Art2 of 
the ECMR it is the Commission that has the burden of proving that a notified merger does not 
impede competition in the Common Market.   
It was also observed that Commissions decisions regarding mergers was not always subjected 
to significant judicial review.  The Courts have made it clear that they have no problem in 
reviewing the Commission’s findings, including primary facts and any interpretations that have 
drawn when determining if the Commissions assessment is free from manifest errors. Whish 
explains that the three judgements in Airtours, Schneider and Tetra Laval collectively “sent a 
strong signal to the Commission that it needed to be more rigorous in its investigations”.  As 
                                                          
105 Renshaw A & Blockx J (2013) p496 
106 Case T- 210/01 General Electric v Commission [2005] ECR II- 5575, [2006] 4 CMLR 686, para 519 
107 Whish R & Bailey D (2012)p831 
108 Joint Case C-56/64 Etablissements Consten Sarl v Commission of the European Economic Community, 
Case C-58/64 Grundig-Verkaufs GmbH v Commission of the European Economic Community [1966] E.C.R. 299 
109 Whish R & Bailey D (2012) p851 
110 Case 42/84, Remia B.V., Verenigde Bedrijven Nutricia N.V. and Another v E.C. Commission [1985] E.C.R. 
2545, 
111 Ibid at para [34]. 
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rightfully stated the court in these judgements succeeded in mollifying some of the concerns 
about the excessive power of the Commission and weak supervision themselves112. This is a 
sentiment that is reiterated throughout the literature.  Renshaw and Blockx point to the fact that 
the possibility of appeal and the courts scrutiny has forced the Commission to improve it 
analysis of cases notified to itself.   The opinion of the ECJ and the Community Courts 
generally has changed over time, it had been viewed as “technical and subservient” and that it 
simply applies treaty provisions of the EU113. However, the courts have become recognized as 
the ultimate force of the integration of Europe114. Geoffry Garret described the courts as 
“faithful agent of the EU member states”115.  Following these observations, it can be 
successfully be argued that the relationship between the Commission and the EU courts has 
shifted from an “integration imperative during the foundational period of the Community, to 
one where the Court is characterized as ‘saviour’ of the European Commission.  However a 
more recent critical relationship of the system has matured, reflecting a need for increased 
credibility and legitimacy 116.  The landmark judgments of the EU in which the Courts annulled 
the Commissions prohibition of the proposed mergers are evidencing a heightened standard of 
review that is in keeping with this observation117.  
Although the commission may have discretion re economic assessment it does not leave it free 
from review from the Community Courts and that this is an “an important part of the whole 
merger control architecture”118. Court annulled Schneider on grounds that the Commissions 
final decision contained basic arguments that were not included in its statement of objections 
and its detailed factual analysis.  This further confirms Airtours and its willingness to review 
in depth the Commissions analysis  The cases of Tertra Laval, Schneider and Airtours are 
renowned.  They raise a debate amongst both practitioners and academics in regards to the 
standard or proof for a commission to prohibit a concentration.  The also raised the debate 
amongst commentator regarding the scope of judicial review in merger decisions, and whether 
the CFI had gone beyond its boundaries of legitimate judicial review?  The opinion is split on 
                                                          
112Whish R & Bailey D (2012) P892 
113 Matti, W & Slaughter A (1998). Revisiting the European Court of Justice. International Organization, Vol. 52, 
No 1 
114 Gibson J; Calderia G (1995). The Legitimacy of Transnational Legal Institutions : Compliance, Support, and 
the European Court of Justice. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 39 Issue 2 p462 
115 Garret G (1995). The Politics of legal integration in the European Union. International Organization 46 
116 Gerber  footnote 192 
117 Jaeger M (2011). The standard of review in competition cases involving complex economic assessments : 
towards the marginalisation of the marginal review?.  Journal of European Competition Law and Practice. 2(4) 
295-314 
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this some issue with some commentators agreeing that the CFI did infringe Art 230 of the 
Treaty and Art 2 of the EUMR. The Commission also considered this in the Tetra Laval case, 
and concluded that the CFI had imposed disproportionate standard of proof for prohibitions 
and that the court had in fact exceeded its role in reviewing decisions by replacing the 
Commissions view with its own.  However there is no general rule was laid down as to what is 
the burden of proof required by the Commission under the EUMR, which removes any 
dependable boundaries of the judicial review that can be undertaken by the Courts legitimizing 
it increased standards.  It has been successfully argued that the Tetra Laval ruling has 
significantly strengthened judicial control over the commission119 and raised the standard of 
proof. Although Bay and Calzado120 go further than just suggesting the courts set out a clear 
and concise test but that the standard should be the same for all merger cases, not just in 
prohibition but when clearing a merger also121.  I find this argument to be one that is compelling 
and one that not so many commentators picked up on.  It is the correct suggestion that not the 
standard of proof should be applied equally across all merger decisions, it would in my opinion 
make the judicial review procedure not only more predictable but credible.  However, the 
Commission is subject to solid transparency requirements and must justify its decision to 
intervene or not intervene, according to the ECJ the standard of proof is the same for both122.   
In regards to the standard of the proof this was looked at in the cases of Airtour’s Schneider 
Electric and Tetra Laval.  In each of the cases the wording regarding this has stayed the same.  
It has been suggested that the CFI has raised the standard of proof.  These cases bought a lot 
of academic attention in regards to the standards of proof that the Commission must reach in 
order to satisfy their decision.  It is well known that the Community Courts do not lightly 
disagree with the Commission’s analysis except in the case were there is a manifest error of 
assessment123.  Nevertheless, a great emphasis was placed on the requisite legal standard and 
what is required of the Commission.  The court requires the need for the Commission put 
forward evidence that the conditions of Art 2(3) ECMR have been satisfied124.  It is from these 
rulings that a reoccurring question is raised within the literature, this is whether the GC has in 
                                                          
119 Petre & Nucara (2005). Standard of proof and scope of judicial review in EC merger cases : everything clear 
after Tetra Laval (2005) E.C.L.R, 26(12) 692-704; Szczordrowski J (2012).Standard of judicial review of merger 
decisions concerning oligopolistic markets. Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies. Vol 2012, 5(6)  
120 Bay M & Calzado J (2005) Tetra Laval II : the coming of age of the judicial review of merger decisions. W. 
Comp, 28(4), 433-453 
121 This something that could be assessed as a lone topic but it is worth mentioning. 
122 Case T- 464/04 Impala v Commission [2006] ECR II- 2289, [2006] 5 CMLR 1049 
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Student No 1104140044 
 
24 
 
fact raised the standard of proof with its ruling.  Some make the observation that the GC has 
indeed created a new and high standard of proof125.  Prete argued that this observation is correct 
evidenced by the fact that the test applied was stricter and the actual review carried out by the 
GC was more concise126.  However, the ECJ on appeal by the commission did not articulate a 
precise and transparent test, which leaves a grey area.   
Academics point to the fact that the courts have had an important role in the substantive 
development of merger control in the EU, especially in the judgements of Airtours and Tetra 
Laval.  The Airtour’s decision has been described as being of crucial importance127, based 
around the concept of collective dominance. The court clarified the test for collective 
dominance so that future cases should be predictable.  The Director at Lexecon Ltd who acted 
as economic advisor to Airtour’s during the case and the appeal described the Courts decision 
to overturn the Commission’s prohibition of the proposed merger as “watershed in the EU 
merger policy.  It is rightfully argued that the most significant aspect of the judgement is the 
clarity given for assessments of future mergers in oligopolistic markets.  The decision was also 
referred to as “a wakeup call” to Commission due to the severity of the judgement.  It reinforces 
the calls for greater transparency and accountability of the Commission’s decision making 
process. The Commission is under an obligation to publish their final decisions; however, it 
can be said that it is not full transparency in its decisions as the evidence gathered during an 
investigation is only made available to the parties concerned in the merger128’129.  The 
Commission stance of the ruling is significantly different to the academic view, the former 
Director General of the DG Competition said that the judgement “was a real blow” “important 
warning shot” and the Commission would have to take it serious.  This statement it could be 
argued sets the mind-set of the Commission is that of a time gone by when it had a greater 
margin of appreciation in its analysis.  It was thought that this ruling would create some 
                                                          
125 J. Temple Lang, “Two important Merger Regulation judgments: the implications of Schneider-Legrand and 
Tetra Laval-Sidel” [2003] E.L. Rev. 268 
A. Burnside, “Preuve Solide: The CFI Raises The Bar” in Competition December 2002, available on 
www.sweetandmaxwell.co.uk; Andreangeli A (2005) Fairness and timing in Merger Control proceedings : will 
the “stop-the-clock” clause work? European Competition Law Review 26(7), 403-409 
126 Perte L & Nucara A (2005). Standard of proof and scope of judicial review in EC merger cases : everything 
clear after tetra Laval?. European Competition Law Review 
127 Haupt H (2002). Case Comment : Collective dominance under Article 82 E.C and E.C. merger control in the 
light of the Airtors judgement.  European Competition Law Review 23(9), 434-444 
128 The commission has occasionally provided a non-confidential version to third parties but is not required to do 
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predictability130 in regards to collective dominance, however it was noted that Moving forward 
from the Airtour’s decision it was observed that he Commission’s thinking regarding to 
collective dominance had evolved even being described as more sophisticated, however it has 
not been systematic the Commission’s stance is still viewed as unpredictable131, highlighting 
the need for change in this area132. This lack of predictability confirms Stroux’s correct 
observation that guidelines on the assessment of collective dominance are “badly needed” to 
provide the Commission with a framework for assessment133.  Contrary to this some 
commentators believe there may be uneven standards applied within the GC and that the fate 
of a particular merger decision may be substantially influenced by the chamber who deals with 
the case, and that not all will apply the standard of judicial review.  Some chambers may follow 
the traditional theory of allowing the discretion to the Commission when assessing complex 
economic matters, whereas others will apply a more thorough scrutiny134.  There is no concrete 
evidence to support this theory and as in life each case is different and each person will have 
their own view, however it is something that has been raised and should be borne in mind.  
One reoccurring problem that has been noted about the effectiveness of the Merger Control 
system in the EU is the time taken by the Courts to reach its judgement. It was noted that the 
length of proceeding before the GC was increasing and so the expedited procedure was 
introduced135.  The average time was 27.5 months in cases other than intellectual property and 
staff cases136.  The expedited procedure was positively picked by up on in the literature and 
following its introduction several cases were heard under this procedure137. Commentators 
noted that the use of this fast track procedure confirmed that the court can deal effectively with 
complex issues in a reduced time frame138 and this was evidentially backed up in the case of 
                                                          
130 Nicolas Petit, The Future of the Court of Justice in EU Competition Law, New Role and Responsibilities, in 
THE COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE: ANALYSES AND PERSPECTIVES 
ON SIXTY YEARS OF CASE-LAW 397 (Ct. of Justice European Union ed., 2013). 
131 Overd A (2002). Editorial : After the Airtours appeal. European Competition Law Review. 23(8), 375 – 377 
132 Overd A (2002). Editorial : After the Airtours appeal. European Competition Law Review. 23(8), 375 – 377 
133 Stroux S (2002). Case Comment : Collective dominance under the Merger Regulation : a serious evidentiary 
reprimand for the Commission. European Law Review, 27(6), 736 – 746. P743 
134 Bay M et al. (2007) 
135 Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities, 2000 O.J. 
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136 Renshaw A & Blockx J (2013) p502 
137 See Case T-310/01, Schneider Elec. v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-4071; Case T-77/02, Schneider Elec. v. 
Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-4201; Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-4381; Case T-80/02, Tetra 
Laval v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-4519; Case T-114/02, BaByliss v. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. II-1279; Case T-
119/02, Royal Philips v. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. II-1433; Case T-87/05, EDP v. Comm’n, 
138 Temple Lang J (2005) Two important Merger Regulation judgements: the implications of Schneider-Legrand 
and Tetra Laval-Sidel 
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Schneider and Tetra.  This fast track procedure can preserve the commercial viability for 
transactions that are able to use this procedure, however this is not always the case and even 
under this procedure it may not allow some parties to complete their transactions139.   However, 
since 2006 all applications for this procedure have been refused.  This could be due to the fact 
that this procedure requires only one ground for appeal and the cases following have been more 
complex and warrant the normal appeals procedure to remove time constrains.  The Fact that 
this option is available only further serves to strengthen the Courts role in merger control.  
Although it would seem we have taken a step backward in regards to the length of time to reach 
judgement as there have been no cases under the fast track for almost 10 years, some 
suggestions to remedy this are for extra judges140, creation of specialized courts141, the 
Commission to review the case and the courts to make final judgement142, replacement of the 
lengthy Phase II investigation143.  It is a reoccurring criticism that academics highlight that the 
decision making powers in relation to antitrust cases should be removed from the commission 
solely to the Community courts144.  All of these are viable options, however this would require 
the EC Treaty to be changed incorporate this addition task. 
The majority of the literature written in relation to the commissions decisions in relation to 
merger with particular reference to the specific case law mentioned above, points to the fact 
some change or amendment is needed.  Although the annulment of the Commission’s decision 
in Airtours145 was overturned by the GC it has raised doubts about the Commission all in one 
role, as ??? rightly points to that a “single erroneous decision” does not show that there is a 
problem of prosecution bias within the Commission.  Errors can occur any institution that we 
may encounter through our lives at time to time, it is weather there is “an abnormal incidence 
of erroneous prohibition decisions”146.  This cannot be the case as the statistics show a small 
percentage of all notifications to the Commission have been prohibited and from these only 4 
overturned upon review.  Are these the actions of an institution that have prosecutorial bias. I 
would argue not on these numbers.  Only Frank Montag has attempted to show statistically that 
the Commission has prosecutorial bias.  This was based around fines imposed for violation of 
Articles 81 or 82 EC, highlighting that only 4 of 24 decisions by the Commission that imposed 
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fines where confirmed by the Courts147.  He concluded that the limited sample should not be 
overlooked as they provide “remarkable evidence of the Commissions poor record in reaching 
decisions imposing fines which come under scrutiny”148.  Again I stand by my earlier 
conclusion that a small amount of wrong decisions out of the 100’s of notifications received 
cannot in any way prove bias on the Commissions behalf. I would suggest that error can creep 
into any procedure. Slater et al believe that the Community competition needs to change or 
there will be future condemnation from the MS collectively or by the ECHR149.  Whilst not 
agreeing with this argument in its entirety, change is needed, as there will never be 
independence and impartiality when one institution is judge jury and executioner. Keeping with 
the theme, one interesting theory put forward is that the Commission’s role is in contravention 
to Article 6(1) ECHR.  There have also been applications before the courts arguing that the 
current system of merger control in which the Commission investigates and makes decisions 
is incompatible with Article 6(1). However, the court disagrees150.  The view was taken in 
Schneider Electric151 was that review by the Community courts of commission decisions is 
sufficient.  They court did however recognise that the Commission it not an “independent and 
impartial tribunal” as under Article 6 ECHR.   
 
Conclusion 
My focus whilst researching this area was whether the Commission does in fact exceed its 
competence in its application of legislation in light of relevant case law? Statistically it cannot 
be said that this is the case due to the small numbers of proposed concentrations actually 
prohibited.  However, I would make the observation that due to the annulment of certain 
Commissions decisions by the Community courts that there may at times be applying the law 
wrong or overstepping it competency in its application.  The legality of a Commission decision 
depends on whether the court can conclude on assessment of the evidence available that the 
two limbs of Article 2(3) of ECMR are satisfied152.  The Court has proven that it is willing to 
                                                          
147 Until 1996 which was his time of writing 
148 F. Montag, ‘The Case for a Radical Reform of the Infringement Procedure under Regulation 17’ (1996) 8 
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review the Commissions decisions in relation to proposed mergers; this is highlighted in the 
annulment of four Commission decisions153.   
As it can be seen the relationship between the Commission and the Community courts is one 
that has shifted over time.  Although the commission had previously enjoyed a margin of 
appreciation the courts have proven that they will assess and if required intervene and set out 
substantive tests for the commission to follow. The collective dominance test was questioned 
by the courts are relevant guidelines were set out. Furthermore, the substantial legal 
requirements in the burden of proof for their decisions have seen the Commission come under 
increased scrutiny from the General Court, although the ECJ missed the opportunity to 
substantially cement the requirement in case law. 
This thesis set out to see if the Commission oversteps its boundaries or if in fact the legislation 
in this area was insufficient.  It cannot be said that the legislation is insufficient as it has 
successfully been applied to prohibit mergers that would have created a dominant position.   .  
However, the case law would suggest that at the Commission has overstepped or carried out 
an insufficient analysis or over analysis incorrectly, although statistically the limited number 
of annulled commission decisions could be said to disprove this and show that the commission 
rarely oversteps its competences set out in the treaty.  However, the court in its progression 
from practical bystander to active player in the EU merger regulation has shown that at times 
the Commission does need checking and that previously the Commissions freedom has made 
them a little over confident in their decision making in this area.  The finding of the courts in 
their review of various cases have shown that they are will to rectify a wrong decision 
Recommendations have been suggested that the Commission should not have the role as judge 
and jury, with various alternatives suggested by commentators, for the moment that is all their 
suggestions and as it stands it is still the Commission who is responsible for merger control 
decisions within the EU, with the Community Courts showing that they will if needed question 
and review decisions in which they feel the Commission has not provided substantial evidence 
for its decisions.  I would surmise that the current system of merger control in the EU is 
sufficient and that the case law in which the Courts have annulled the commissions decisions 
does not support the need for immediate change and that Commission is far exceeding its 
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competence in its application of legislation causing it to be ineffective in light of relevant case 
law. 
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